Because Carlos has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Deborah decidesthat she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount.After Deborah increases her production, Carlos's profit becomes $Deborah's profit becomes $and total profit(the sum of the profits of Carlos and Deborah) is now $True or False: Based on the fact that both Carlos and Deborah increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effectwas larger than the price effect at that quantity.O TrueO FalseCarlos and Deborah have each cheated on their cartel agreement and increased production by 35 gallons more than the cartel amount. However, theyboth realize that if they continue to increase output beyond this amount, they'll each suffer a decrease in profit. (To see this for yourself, considerCarlos's profit when he produces 70 gallons more than the cartel amount compared to his profit when he produces 35 gallons more than the cartelamount.)Neither Carlos nor Deborah has an incentive to increase output further, nor does either have an incentive to decrease output. This outcome is anexample of 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreementConsider a town in which only two residents, Carlos and Deborah, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Carlos and Deborah can pump andsell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.PriceQuantity DemandedTotal Revenue(Dollars per gallon)(Gallons of water)(Dollars)3.603.3035$115.503.0070$210.002.70105$283.502.40140$336.002.10175$367.501.80210$378.001.50245$367.501.20280$336.000.90315$283.500.60350$210.000.30385$115.50420per gallon, and the totalSuppose Carlos and Deborah form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $output isgallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Carlos and Deborah agree to split production equally. Therefore, Carlos's profit is24and Deborah's profit is $orice and sell half of the monopolySuppose that Carlos and Deborah have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopolyquantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Carlos says to himself, "Deborah and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow."to $per gallon. Given Deborah and Carlos's productionAfter Carlos implements his new plan, the price of waterand Deborah's profit becomes $levels, Carlos's profit becomes $

Answered: sell as much water as they want at no…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Jake and Latasha, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jake and Latasha can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 5.40 0 0 4.95 40 $198.00 4.50 80 $360.00 4.05 120 $486.00 3.60 160 $576.00 3.15 200 $630.00 2.70 240 $648.00 2.25 280 $630.00 1.80 320 $576.00 1.35 360 $486.00 0.90 400 $360.00 0.45 440 $198.00 0 480 0 Suppose Jake and Latasha form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jake and Latasha agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jake's profit is , and Latasha's profit is . Suppose that Jake and…
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Daniel and Gabrielle, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Daniel and Gabrielle can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 4.20 0 0 3.85 40 $154.00 3.50 80 $280.00 3.15 120 $378.00 2.80 160 $448.00 2.45 200 $490.00 2.10 240 $504.00 1.75 280 $490.00 1.40 320 $448.00 1.05 360 $378.00 0.70 400 $280.00 0.35 440 $154.00 0 480 0 Suppose Daniel and Gabrielle form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Daniel and Gabrielle agree to split production equally. Therefore, Daniel's profit is and Gabrielle's profit is $
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Musashi and Rina, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Musashi and Rina can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 2.70 105 $283.50 2.40 140 $336.00 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00 1.50 245 $367.50 1.20 280 $336.00 0.90 315 $283.50 0.60 350 $210.00 0.30 385 $115.50 420 Suppose Musashi and Rina form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Musashi and Rina agree to split production equally. Therefore, Musashi's profit is %2$ , and Rina's profit is $
e ap sep 0 ja ajaloo Purwas ap o Consider a town in which only two residents, Clancy and Eileen, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Clancy and Eileen can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Tab Caps Lock Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 5.50 5.00 4.50 Esc is 81°F Sunny 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 ! 0.50 0 7 Q A Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 45 17 F2 8- @ Suppose Clancy and Eileen form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Clancy and Eileen agree to split production equally. Therefore, Clancy's profit is - C VE 2 W 90 135 S. 180 225 270 315 360 405 450 495 540 F3 0+ #M 3 Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 $247.50 $450.00 $607.50 $720.00 $787.50 $810.00 $787.50 $720.00 $607.50 E F4 BO $450.00 $247.50 0 D $ 4 F5 R F % 5 F6 D T F7 ^ 6 G 4- Y FB J+ & 7 per gallon, and the total…
4. An amusement park has 1 000 visitors every Saturday and charges $55 per person to enter the park. Research shows that for every $1 decrease in price, 25 more people will come to the park, and for every $1 increase in price, 25 fewer people will come to the park. The park has a maximum capacity of 1 600 people, and they must have more than 800 visitors to break even. What price should they charge to maximise their revenue, to the nearest dollar?
PRICE (Dollars per engine) 100 90 80 70 60 40 30 & 2 20 10 MO D 0 10 ATC MR Demand 20 30 40 50 60 70 DO 90 QUANTITY (Thousands of engines) 100 Mon Comp Outcome Min Unit Cost Because this market is a monopolistically competitive market, you can tell that it is in long-run equilibrium by the fact that optimal quantity. Furthermore, a monopolistically competitive firm's average total cost in long-run equilibrium is average total cost. at the the minimum
2. The market for dark chocolate us characterized by Cournot duopolists - Honeydukes and Wonka industries. The market demand for dark chocolate is:P = 8 - 0.005Qdwhere P is the price per bar in dollars and Qd is dark chocolate's daily quantity demanded in bars (use qh to represent the quantity of dark chocolate sold by Honeydukes and qw to represent the quantity of dark chocolate sold by Wonka Industries). Honeydukes has a constant marginal cost of $2.50 per bar, while Wonka Industries has a constant marginal cost of $3.00 per bar. The firms move simultaneously in choosing their profit-maximizing quantity of output.a. Given the firms move simultaneously, what is the equation for Honeydukes' reaction function with qh expressed as a function of qw?b. Given the firms move simultaneously, what is the equation for Wonka's reaction function with qw expressed as a function of qh?c. What quantity of dark chocolate will each firm produce in equilibrium and what price will be established for a…
Quèstion 13 Figure#5 $10 MC ATC $7 $6 $5 $4 $3 $2 $1 MR $0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Quantity Refer to Figure#5. This figure depicts a situation in a monopolistically competitive market. In long run, how much output will the monopolistic competition produce and will charge at what price? Price 9876 5A32
Quantity (in gallons) Total Price Revenue $8 $0 50 7 350 100 600 150 750 200 4 800 250 3 750 300 600 350 1 350 400 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk. Their respective dairies are equal in size. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce and what price to charge. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero and there are no fixed costs. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table above. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Maria and Miguel from operating as a cartel. Assuming that each producer can only modify quantity in increments of 50, which of the following is consistent with the Nash equilibrium for this scenario? Maria will charge a price of $5 for each gallon. Miguel will sell 100 gallons. Milk will…
6. The cartel Consider a town in which only two residents, Rajiv and Simone, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Rajiv and Simone can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 0 0 5.50 45 247.50 5.00 90 450.00 4.50 135 607.50 4.00 180 720.00 3.50 225 787.50 3.00 270 810.00 2.50 315 787.50 2.00 360 720.00 1.50 405 607.50 1.00 450 450.00 0.50 495 247.50 0 540 0 Suppose Rajiv and Simone form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Rajiv and Simone agree to split production equally. Therefore, Rajiv's profit is $ and Simone's profit is $ Suppose that Rajiv and Simone have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of…
9. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements a. The demand eurve facing a monopolistic competitor in a market where all producers charge different prices becomes less elastic when it engages in international trade b. According to the gravity equation, countries closer to each other trade more c. The only gain from trade in monopolistic competition in trade is lower prices d. The closer to 1 the index of intra industry trade is, the greater the difference between exports and imports of the same goods.
Costs and Revenues (dollars per room) 200 180 160 140 120 ➜ 100 80 60 40- 0 5 10 Market for Monica's Hotel 15 20 25 30 35 Quantity (rooms) 40 D₂ MC ATC MR 45 50 Multiple Choice Question Use the graph of a monopolistically competitive firm above to answer the following question. What is the amount of profit or less Monica will make at the profit maximizing price and quantity? O Profit of $2000 O Profit of $0 O Loss of $2000

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sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 2.70 105 $283.50 2.40 140 $336.00 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00