Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Knowledge is the key to being able to come up with an effective plan. Therefore, the more knowledge held the better the plan will be. When it comes to irregular warfare, Marines will need to have knowledge on many different things, the first being the enemy. Acquiring every detail possible about the enemy will give Marines an understanding of what exactly the enemy is capable of with the numbers, assets, and leadership they have. Second is the enemy’s target population. Having a greater knowledge on the population will allow Marines to understand how the enemy might use the resources available to sway the population. The last piece of knowledge is history. General James Mattis said, “We have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and we should take advantage of their experience.” By studying and obtaining the knowledge of conflicts throughout history, Marines will be able to use that information to devise a course of

To fully identify how counterintelligence supports the maneuver commander an understanding of the operational framework that the maneuver units operate in must be understood. The Army’s overall conceptual framework has changed over time due to the Army’s participation in conflicts. To appreciate the current mission of maneuver forces a quick glance of recent history must be accomplished. In 1982 the Army’s capstone doctrine focus was AirLand Battle. This primarily

A submission to the Faculty of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements for Joint Professional Military Education Phase II. The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Sun Tzu’s military acumen resonates in the current discussion of the Marine Corps’ preparedness to conduct forcible entry. The Army and Marine Corps saw significant successes utilizing forcible entry and amphibious operations in the Pacific during WWII and the Korean War. The landing at Inchon was “arguably the Corps’ greatest amphibious success” (Cancian, “Preserving Amphibious Capabilities in a Time of Austerity, 2012). Led by General MacArthur, Inchon remains the legacy by which future amphibious operations are compared against. However, it is important to recognize that in the past 60+ years since Inchon, the modern militarization of both state and non-state adversaries has transformed the battlespace to utilize warfare across multiple domains. This transformation requires a forthright Sun Tzu-like comparison of Marine Corps capabilities, and the perspicacity to recognize that our current posture along with a traditional approach to amphibious warfare is no longer effective at countering our enemies. Given the challenges that exist across the domains of military operations, this paper will demonstrate how based on the current concepts and amphibious capabilities, the U.S. Marine Corps is less prepared to conduct forcible entry operations than we were during the landing at Inchon, and subsequent liberation of Seoul.

Following over a decade of irregular war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is attempting to reset towards a conventional, regular type of warfare. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a U.S. military shift to the Pacific and the supremacy of capability against near peer nations rather than support irregular of and counterinsurgency operations. As the QDR points out the U.S. military must “be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace.” This is balanced against the reality that “our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged

On the basis of United States Code, Title 10, and joint doctrine, the Marine Corps, in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) expeditionary warfighting capabilities. This means that the Marine Corps’ logistics mission, at all commands and support levels, is to generate MAGTFs that are rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining, and flexible and that can rapidly reconstitute (Logistics Operations, 1999). While the Marine Corps is unmatched in its ability to be the most rapid responding force across the globe, a deficiency exists that should be addressed. Over the past decade, there have been numerous successful innovations in ground and aviation logistics, but they have lacked in standardization or integration within the MAGTF. Emerging operating concepts such as disaggregated MAGTF operations and seabasing, along with current fiscal constraints, are driving the need to further modernize and integrate MAGTF logistics in order to optimize support to the warfighter (Borrelli & Hodge, 2013). Independently, the logistical concepts and systems that exist for the ground elements and the aviation elements are proven to be effective and efficient, however, when the aviation and ground elements work in concert the response of logistical support is hindered. This paper will offer possible solutions to close the logistics gap between the Marines Corps’ aviation and

The United States Marine Corps is facing already 7th decade, since one of the major amphibious operation in history of 20th century. Yes, there are many developments for concepts, capabilities, training, organization and command structure, but purpose and nature of the amphibious operations still unchanged through the time. Based on the case studies of operation “CHROMITE” and comparing with current concepts and capabilities of the Marine Corps, we are prepared better to conduct forcible entry operations and follow on actions.

Flexibility in modern combat is a must. Today’s force faces a unique mission set that can, and usually does change on the fly. In the events described below, I will discuss a combat patrol in Eastern Afghanistan that will be with me forever, and lessons that I subsequently learned.

The Army and Marines face a rapidly changing operational environment, requiring difficult decisions on how to allocate limited resources to address emerging capabilities and remain a relevant element of national power. While there is no way to predict exactly what capabilities they will need in the future, history indicates that land forces will be

Special operations embody a distinct military capability of strategic value to national security. In a strategic culture, military special operations and SOF—SOF power—represent a unique type of military power in the same manner that land, naval, and air power differ and have need of theory and doctrine to guide their strategy, operations, and professional development. SOF are a distinct military instrument as are the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Joint Forces. All are founded in and attentive on the occurences of war and part of the military profession, but are dedicated to capabilities engrained in differing qualities, attributes, characteristics, and doctrine that allow them to better overcome friction and achieve

EF-21 describes as the Marine Corps serving as an “expeditionary force-in-readiness” that focuses on amphibious operations centered on a culture that “fast, austere, lethal”. The adage that “words have meaning” should be considered when we start talking about employing a lethal force that is built upon the idea that individual units will act in accordance with broad intent and limited support. Peace operations in particular present a unique set of challenges as civil and military considerations change throughout the operation and those considerations are necessarily accompanied by restrictive ROE and codes of conduct. In general this long term “police” type action is not well suited to a force dedicated to being “the right force at the right

The research topic of Information Warfare is of interest to me because as a Marine we have always been taught to use our mind, think critically and to be open to change. If the Marine Corps is to remain relevant and continue to be one of the most lethal fighting forces in the world, we must be able to adapt to emerging threats and be prepared at all times. Although my focus is applying my research topic of Information Warfare to the Marine Corps, I think it is relevant and essential to all the services and every soldier, sailor and airman needs to ask the same question that is being asked of the Marine Corps. While the Marine Corps has been involved in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom during the last decade

As the United States Marines Corps continues to push forward for new and innovative ways to continue to improve our amphibious capabilities, Expeditionary Force 21 (EF 21) takes a progressive look at our forces and what is required to successfully conduct amphibious operations as we move forward in an ever evolving environment with our littoral. This paper will compare the Expeditionary Force 21 vision against the future of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in the next 10 years, and how the MEU needs to evolve to meet the EF 21 concept. This will include adjusting the forward posture, with an emphasis on naval integration and conducting security cooperation exercises. Further, it will cover enhancing the littoral maneuver capacity of the

While reading the case study about the problems during the structure of the Panama Canal, I identified two principles of warfare that can be applied to our own “Scorges” in the Marine Corps. Executing “Training”, and “Orienting on the enemy”, are two important warfighting principles that were not properly executed during the initial phase of the construction. The “standing water” that we see today in the Marine Corps can be tied back to these two principle of warfighting which i will be explaining.

Warfighting in today’s environment often leans towards the Irregular Warfare (IW) side of the house where Operational Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB) is required to ensure that should conventional military forces be deployed, they