3. Player A and Player B can either play up, middle, or down in a simultaneous move game. The payoff matrix for the game is written below. Predict the outcome by finding all Nash Equilibria. Hint: a Nash equilibria cannot contain dominated strategies. Player B Player A Up Middle Down Up 3,1 0,0 2,0 Middle 0,0 2,3 -1,-1 Down 2,0 -1,-1 0,10 4. Does your answer to Question 3 change if Player A was able to play before Player B?

3. Player A and Player B can either play up, middle, or down in a simultaneous move game. The payoff matrix for the game is written below. Predict the outcome by finding all Nash Equilibria. Hint: a Nash equilibria cannot contain dominated strategies. Player B Player A Up Middle Down Up 3,1 0,0 2,0 Middle 0,0 2,3 -1,-1 Down 2,0 -1,-1 0,10 4. Does your answer to Question 3 change if Player A was able to play before Player B?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.7P

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