7. Which of the following is not true of the "Battle of the Sexes" Game? a. The predicted outcome demonstrates how independent and rational play by players can quickly reach an agreement or a convergence of expectations concerning which strategy will be played by each player in equilibrium. b. The Battle of the Sexes Game can be used to depict a variety of situations where the players' interests do not precisely coincide, except for the fact that they both want to avoid the outcomes that would result from choosing different actions from one another. c. Players do not have a dominant strategy but playing "Boxing" say, is a best response to the other playing "Boxing" even if it doesn't give the player the payoff associated with his or her preferred alternative. d. Played only once, the outcome where each goes to their preferred venue cannot be Nash Equilibrium.

7. Which of the following is not true of the "Battle of the Sexes" Game? a. The predicted outcome demonstrates how independent and rational play by players can quickly reach an agreement or a convergence of expectations concerning which strategy will be played by each player in equilibrium. b. The Battle of the Sexes Game can be used to depict a variety of situations where the players' interests do not precisely coincide, except for the fact that they both want to avoid the outcomes that would result from choosing different actions from one another. c. Players do not have a dominant strategy but playing "Boxing" say, is a best response to the other playing "Boxing" even if it doesn't give the player the payoff associated with his or her preferred alternative. d. Played only once, the outcome where each goes to their preferred venue cannot be Nash Equilibrium.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.7P

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i. ii. QUESTION ONE A. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that every player's strategy is the best response to all the other players. It requires that each player makes a best response and that expectations regarding the play of other players are correct. Below is the table showing strategies and payoff for Player 1 and Player 2. PLAYER 1 R1 R2 R3 R4 C1 0,7 5,2 7,0 6,6 C2 2,5 3,3 2,5 2,2 PLAYER 2 C3 7,0 5,2 0,7 4,4 CA 6,6 2,2 4,4 10,4 REQUIRED; Transform the normal form game above into an imperfect extensive game form Find the Nash equilibrium for the game above using iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Find the Nash equilibrium using brute force or cell by cell inspection.
1. Consider a game of chicken: two players approach a narrow bridge with room only for one, and each chooses either to go through and hope the other guy backs off (call this action H, for "hawk"), or backs off to let the other go through (call this action D, for "dove"). If both players are normal, then each gets a payoff of -1 from a collision (i.e. if both choose H), 1 if they choose H against D, 0 if they choose D (regardless of what the other player chooses). Now perturb the game as follows: there is a chance p > 0 that P2 is a “violent type", who gets 1 from playing H regardless of Pl's action, and -1 from playing D, again regardless of P1's action. (a) Illustrate the game tree corresponding to the Harsanyi transformation of this game (i.e. the dynamic game of imperfect information in which nature moves first). (b) Illustrate the extended game (i.e. the normal form game corresponding to your game tree in part (a)). (c) Find all values of p for which there is a BNE in which P1…
3. For the friend-foe game, recall that there were 3 Nash equilibria possible, but the equilibria set didn't include the cooperative outcome, for which both players would win. Friend Foe Friend | 500,500 0,1000 Foe 1000,0 0,0 a) If the game is played repeatedly, propose a play strategy that will enforce cooperation. For what values of ô (discount factor) the equilibrium will be (Friend, Friend)?
Consider the following game : Stag Rabbit Stag 9, 9 0, 8 Rabbit 8, 0 7, 7 The first payoff is that of player 1 and the second that of player 2. a. ) Draw the extensive form of the simultaneous game. Find all the Nash equilibrium. p. Suppose player 1 moves first or we are in a sequential game now. Draw the extensive form in the sequential version. c. What is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the sequential version? d. ) Explain why it is an SPNE.
The following payoff matrix represents a simultaneous-move game between two players: Kay and Jack. Each player has two choices: Black or White. The first number in each cell is the payoff to Kay, and the second number is the payoff to Jack. Jay Black White 50, 30, Black 50 30 Кay 45, 40, White 30 50 Refer to the scenario above. Which is true? a. This game has a dominant strategy equilibrium. b. This game has two dominant strategy equilibria. c. This game has two Nash equilibria. d. This game has one Nash equilibrium.
a) Draw an extensive form game with 4 outcomes (2 moves for player 1 followed by 2 moves for 2 after each of 1's moves) and no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. b) Write the strategic form to verify your answer to (a) c) Draw an extensive form 2-player game, in which both players always move, that has exactly 4 outcomes, 1 subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and no non-subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and no dominant strategies. d) Write the strategic form and use it to verify your answer to (b)
3. Two individuals are planning to start a business. The earnings from a grocery store business would be $30,000 for each, but the business requires two people (one to watch over the stock and the other to act as a cashier). Each individual could instead start an mpesa business. The take from mpesa business is only $3000 but can be done with one person acting alone. i) Write down the payoff matrix for this game ( ii) Solve the Nash equilibrium
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The following payoff matrix represents a simultaneous-move game between two players: John and Trevor. Each player has to choices: Black or White. The first number in each cell is the payoff to John, and the second number is the payoff to Trevor. Trevor Black White Black 15, 15 10, 10 John White 12, 10 13, 15 Refer to the table above. Which statement is true? a. Neither John nor Trevor have a dominant strategy in this game. b. Only Trevor has a dominant strategy in this game. c. Only John has a dominant strategy in this game. d. John and Trevor both have a dominant strategy in this game.
1. Prove that every trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (for the agent normal form) is sequential. Show by example that the converse is false. The remaining problems in this chapter concern game-theoretic variations on the classic models of oligopoly. They are primarily about those models and so relate more to material in other chapters, but they could not have been posed until we had covered Nash equilibria and sub game perfection. 2. Prove that in the Bertrand game, if prices must be charged in integer multiples of a penny, then there is always at least one Nash equilibrium in which players do not use weakly dominated strategies.
1. Each of two players simultaneously announces either Rock, Paper, or Scissors. Paper beats Rock, Rock beats Scissors, and Scissors beats Paper. The player who names the winning object receives $1 from her opponent. If both players make the same choice, no payment is made. Each players's preferences are represented by by the expected amount of money she receives. a) Formulate the situation as a strategic game and find all its mixed strategy equilibria. Make sure that you consider all different supports. b) Find all the mixed strategy equilibria of the modified game in which player 2 is prohibited from announcing Rock.
In a gambling game, Player A and Player B both have a $1 and a $5 bill. Each player selects one of the bills without the other player knowing the bill selected. Simultaneously they both reveal the bills selected. If the bills do not match, Player A wins Player B's bill. If the bills match, Player B wins Player A's bill. a. Develop the game theory table for this game. The values should be expressed as the gains (or losses) for Player A. b. Is there a pure strategy? Why or why not? Determine the optimal strategies and the value of this game. Does the game favor one player over the other? d. Suppose Player B decides to deviate from the optimal strategy and begins playing each bill 50% of the time. What should Player A do to improve Player A’s winnings? Comment on why it is important to follow an optimal game theory strategy. с.