Consider a good for which the per-period inverse- demand is p = v – Q. There are two periods and no discounting. There is an incumbent firm I that has marginal production cost c₁ < 1 in the first period. In the second period, its marginal production cost is C₂ = C₁ — λq₁, where q₁ is its output in the first period and λ € (0,2). 1-C₁

Principles of Economics 2e
2nd Edition
ISBN:9781947172364
Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Chapter9: Monopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 31P: Return to Figure 9.2. Suppose P0 is 10 and P1 is 11. Suppose a new firm with the same LRAC curve as...
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Consider a good for which the per-period inverse- demand is p = v - Q. There are two periods and
no discounting. There is an incumbent firm I that has marginal production cost c₁ < 1 in the first
period. In the second period, its marginal production cost is C₂ = C₁ — λq₁, where q₁ is its output in
the first period and λ € (0,2).
a. Show that the incumbent will produce q₁ =
11. Interpret it with respect to 1.
2-λ
Suppose now that there is a potential entrant E that might enter in the second period. It has
marginal production cost C = C₁ and no cost of entry. Because of the latter, for the sake of
clarity, suppose that the entrant always enters but may produce zero (in which case it does not
enter de facto). The two firms compete in quantities.
b. Find the equilibrium in the second period given some C₂.
c. How does q₁ affect the incumbent's and entrant's profits in the second period?
d. Find the equilibrium value of q₁. When is entry blockaded, deterred and accommodated,
respectively?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a good for which the per-period inverse- demand is p = v - Q. There are two periods and no discounting. There is an incumbent firm I that has marginal production cost c₁ < 1 in the first period. In the second period, its marginal production cost is C₂ = C₁ — λq₁, where q₁ is its output in the first period and λ € (0,2). a. Show that the incumbent will produce q₁ = 11. Interpret it with respect to 1. 2-λ Suppose now that there is a potential entrant E that might enter in the second period. It has marginal production cost C = C₁ and no cost of entry. Because of the latter, for the sake of clarity, suppose that the entrant always enters but may produce zero (in which case it does not enter de facto). The two firms compete in quantities. b. Find the equilibrium in the second period given some C₂. c. How does q₁ affect the incumbent's and entrant's profits in the second period? d. Find the equilibrium value of q₁. When is entry blockaded, deterred and accommodated, respectively?
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