Imperfect competition and moral hazard. Some economists have argued that moral hazard and monopolistic health care markets are two socially inefficient problems that partially cancel each other out. Relative to the optimal level of health care Q∗, how much health care is provided in the presence of moral hazard? Assume perfectly competitive health care markets. Relative to the optimal level of health care Q∗, how much health care is provided in the presence of monopolistic health care markets? Assume no moral hazard. Write a one-sentence defense of the argument that moral hazard and imperfectly competitive health care markets could combine to provide a good level of health care provision Q.

Imperfect competition and moral hazard. Some economists have argued that moral hazard and monopolistic health care markets are two socially inefficient problems that partially cancel each other out. Relative to the optimal level of health care Q∗, how much health care is provided in the presence of moral hazard? Assume perfectly competitive health care markets. Relative to the optimal level of health care Q∗, how much health care is provided in the presence of monopolistic health care markets? Assume no moral hazard. Write a one-sentence defense of the argument that moral hazard and imperfectly competitive health care markets could combine to provide a good level of health care provision Q.

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter5: Demand For Health And Medical Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9QAP

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