Refer to the graph of market demand and marginal revenue. Two firms have formed a centralized cartel in order to maximize profit on the market. Their marginal cost curves are given below: 100 Price 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ก 2 -5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Demand Quantity Show Transcribed Text MC₁ = 10Q1 and MC₂ = 30 Q2 In order to maximize profit, the firms should produce Q1 = 3, Q2 = 1, and charge P= 60. How do I solve this?

Refer to the graph of market demand and marginal revenue. Two firms have formed a centralized cartel in order to maximize profit on the market. Their marginal cost curves are given below: 100 Price 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 ก 2 -5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Demand Quantity Show Transcribed Text MC₁ = 10Q1 and MC₂ = 30 Q2 In order to maximize profit, the firms should produce Q1 = 3, Q2 = 1, and charge P= 60. How do I solve this?

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3SCQ: Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand. marginal cost, and marginal...

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PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 + 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 MC=ATC MR 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 QUANTITY (Thousands of cans of beer) Monopoly Outcome When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ cans and charge $ so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to $ while McCovey's profit is now $ Mays increases…
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ne Semester 2023 dules nouncements NWP Assessment Play X signments scussions yllabus Grades Zoom People Turnitin https://calstatela.instructure.com/courses/85933/quizzes/382812/take Oligopoly Oaksville has two tennis instructors, Sam and Jack. The figure shows the demand curve and marginal revenue for tennis lesson appointments and the average total cost. Price and cost (dollars per appointment) Microsoft Office 365 Google Apps Type here to search X F1 @ 2 21 A- F2 A+ F3 Quiz: Homework 7 #3 X F4 BI $ 4 70 60 50 40 30 23 10 ☀ - F5 0 X % 5 2 Alt Text: pink glitter ro X Alt Text: appointments Competitive Outcome, (Pcomp, Qcomp) ☀+ F6 6 MR 8 F7 6 4 10 Quantity (appointments per hour) L yu F8 8 & 7 O MC D ATC F9 Negative Manuscript X * 00 8 F10 ( 9 n F11 ) 0 Oracle Peopl 59°F Mostly clouc ☆ A to F12 Hom
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6. Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together.
4:21 lLTE Work 13. In the Nash equilibrium of a prisoner's dilemma: 14. Suppose Acme and Mega produce and sell identical products and face zero marginal and average cost. Below is the market demand curve for their product 4 3 2 D 0 0 50 200 100 150 Quantity Suppose Acme and Mega decide to collude and work together as a monopolist with each firm producing half the quantity demanded by the market at the monopoly price. If Mega cheats on the agreement by red ucing its price to $1 and Acme matches the price cut, then if consumers are evenly split between the two firms, Acme's economic profit will be Price ($/unit)