Suppose that 20 risk neutral competitors participate in a rent seeking game with a fixed prize of $500. Each player may invest as much money as he wishes in the political contest. The probability of winning is directly proportional to the candidate's share of the total rent-seeking investment. 1. What is the expected net benefit of a player if all other players invest $20 each? Write the net benefit as a function of the player's investment. 2. Solve the maximization problem to arrive at the profit-maximizing investment. Round to the nearest cent.
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- 7. Suppose the only game in town involves flipping a fair coin (so Heads and Tails are equally likely), with a $x bet. If Heads comes up, the payoff is $0.9x; if Tails comes up, you lose the $x. You have $10,000, and must win at least $5,000 by tomorrow morning to pay off a debt to a mean dude. a. Compute the likelihood of winning at least $5000 by making a single bet of $10,000. b. Compute the likelihood of winning at least $1000 by playing the game 10,0000 times and betting a dollar each time. What is the likelihood of not losing money? Message learned?You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…Suppose that the University of Alabama and Clemson are making spending decisions for theupcoming year. Assume that Alabama is currently spending $15 million on their recruiting andfacilities, and Clemson is spending $10 million. Each team has an additional $5 million to spendor keep as profits. If they both choose to not spend the additional $5 million then Alabama hasa 60% chance of getting the highest quality quarterback recruit to commit to them (getting thecommitment of the player is the goal). However, if they both choose to spend the additional $5million then there is a 57% chance that Alabama gets the high quality quarterback to commit. IfAlabama spends the additional $5 million but Clemson doesn’t then there is a 67% chanceAlabama gets the recruit. However, if Alabama does NOT spend the additional $5million butClemson does then there is a 50% change either team gets the recruit’s commitment. Setup thepayoff matrix and label the players, their strategies, and their payoffs, and…
- 1. A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the occurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wagers W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and o if it does not. Assume that the Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = -e-rx with r>0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA?Bob is playing 1/4 L + 3/4 R. What is Ann's expected payoff of playing D? Game Bob L RAnn U 10,-1 0, 1 D 4, 1 8, -11. A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the o ccurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wager s W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and if it does not. Assume that t he Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = -e-TX with r> 0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA?
- 3. Find the saddle point, if it exists, for the following game. (b) Solve the following game by using the principle of dominance and find the probabilities of strategies for each player and the value of the game. Player B Player A II III IV V 3 4 4 II 2 4 III 4 4 IV 4 4 20 2420 87607. Principal-Agent II A risk-neutral principal can hire a risk-averse agent to undertake a project. There are two possible outcomes for the gross profit of the principal, TL There are also two possible effort levels that the agent can exert, e = 0 or 1; if e = 0, the probability of TH is only 1/3, but if e = 1, the probability of TH increases to 2/3. 20 and TH = 50. The agent's utility from receiving a wage wand exerting effort e is Vw – e, and the agent has a reservation utility of ū = 2. (a) Assume that effort is observable. What wage will the principal offer if she wants to induce low effort? What wage will she offer if she wants to induce high effort? What contract is optimal for the principal?QUESTION 6 Paul is a risk loving decision maker, facing a lottery that yields either zero or 100 pounds with equal probabilities. A O a. Paul will agree to sell the lottery if and only if X> 100 Ob. Paul would never sell the lottery because he likes risk O. Paul may agree to sell the lottery for X 50
- 2. Suppose you asked the following question to Person A and Person B: "How much are you willing to pay to avoid the following fair gamble – win $100 with 50% chance and lose $100 with 50% chance (thus, Variance is equal to 10,000)?" A's answer- $2 B's answer-$10 Assuming that A and B have CARA utility function, a) compute their absolute risk aversion coefficients (approximately) and b) compute their risk premiums for avoiding the following new gamble - win $500 with 50% chance and lose $500 with 50% chance.a Suppose you are given a choice between thefollowing options:A1: Win $30 for sureA2: 80% chance of winning $45 and 20% chance ofA2: winning nothing B1: 25% chance of winning $30B2: 20% chance of winning $45Most people prefer A1 to A2 and B2 to B1. Explainwhy this behavior violates the assumption that decisionmakers maximize expected utility.b Now suppose you play the following game: You havea 75% chance of winning nothing and a 25% chance ofplaying the second stage of the game. If you reach thesecond stage, you have a choice of two options (C1 andC2), but your choice must be made now, before youreach the second stage.C1: Win $30 for sureC2: 80% chance of winning $45 13.5 Bayes’ Rule and Decision Trees 767Most people choose C1 over C2 and B2 to B1 (from part(a)). Explain why this again violates the assumption ofexpected utility maximization. Tversky and Kahneman(1981) speculate that most people are attracted to thesure $30 in the second stage, even though the secondstage may never be…1. A dealer decides to sell a rare book by means of an English auction with a reservation price of 54. There are two bidders. The dealer believes that there are only three possible values, 90, 54, and 45, that each bidder’s willingness to pay might take. Each bidder has a probability of 1/3 of having each of these willingnesses to pay, and the probabilities for each of the two bidders are independent of the other’s valuation. Assuming that the two bidders bid rationally and do not collude, the dealer’s expected revenue is approximately ______. 2. A seller knows that there are two bidders for the object he is selling. He believes that with probability 1/2, one has a buyer value of 5 and the other has a buyer value of 10 and with probability 1/2, one has a buyer value of 8 and the other has a buyer value of 15. He knows that bidders will want to buy the object so long as they can get it for their buyer value or less. He sells it in an English auction with a reserve price which he must…