There are 3 bidders with valuations that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In equilibrium, what will Bidder 1 bid in a first-price auction if its valuation is 0.7? Round your answer to two decimal places.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
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Chapter15A: Auction Design And Information Economics
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There are 3 bidders with valuations that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
In equilibrium, what will Bidder 1 bid in a first-price auction if its valuation is 0.7? Round your answer to
two decimal places.
Transcribed Image Text:There are 3 bidders with valuations that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In equilibrium, what will Bidder 1 bid in a first-price auction if its valuation is 0.7? Round your answer to two decimal places.
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