There are two types of workers in financial industry: A (able) type and C (challenged) type. Potential employers in finance will pay $160,000 a year to a type A and $60,000 to a type C. Unfortunately, employers cannot observe the worker's type while each worker knows his or her own type. However, a market research informs all employers and workers that 60% of the population is type A and 40% is type C. a) Assume that employers in finance treat every applicant as a random draw from the population and pay all the same salary. Then, the pooling salary is $ (Hint: omit the thousands separator). b) Alternative employment opportunities outside of the financial industry yield the A types a salary of $125,000 and the C types a salary of $30,000. If the pooling salary in a) is offered to any applicant in finance, type workers will leave the financial industry and only type workers will stay in the industry. When this continues, the salary in finance will eventually reduce to $ (Hint: omit the thousands separator).

There are two types of workers in financial industry: A (able) type and C (challenged) type. Potential employers in finance will pay $160,000 a year to a type A and $60,000 to a type C. Unfortunately, employers cannot observe the worker's type while each worker knows his or her own type. However, a market research informs all employers and workers that 60% of the population is type A and 40% is type C. a) Assume that employers in finance treat every applicant as a random draw from the population and pay all the same salary. Then, the pooling salary is $ (Hint: omit the thousands separator). b) Alternative employment opportunities outside of the financial industry yield the A types a salary of $125,000 and the C types a salary of $30,000. If the pooling salary in a) is offered to any applicant in finance, type workers will leave the financial industry and only type workers will stay in the industry. When this continues, the salary in finance will eventually reduce to $ (Hint: omit the thousands separator).

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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