Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q) = 20-Q. All firms have constant marginal costs. Firm 1's marginal cost is MC = 5; it has a capacity constraint of K1 = 5 units. Firm 2's marginal cost is MC = 8; it has a capacity constraint of K2 = 2.5 units. Firm 3's marginal cost is MC= 10; it has a capacity constraint of K3 = 2.5 units. A. The three firms compete in the style of Cournot. Please compute the Nash equilibrium quantities. Also compute the price in the Nash equilibrium. B. Which of these firms would have produced a larger quantity if it had a larger capacity? Please explain

Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q) = 20-Q. All firms have constant marginal costs. Firm 1's marginal cost is MC = 5; it has a capacity constraint of K1 = 5 units. Firm 2's marginal cost is MC = 8; it has a capacity constraint of K2 = 2.5 units. Firm 3's marginal cost is MC= 10; it has a capacity constraint of K3 = 2.5 units. A. The three firms compete in the style of Cournot. Please compute the Nash equilibrium quantities. Also compute the price in the Nash equilibrium. B. Which of these firms would have produced a larger quantity if it had a larger capacity? Please explain

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter11: Price And Output Determination: Monopoly And Dominant Firms

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3E

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Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q) = 20 - Q. All %3D firms have constant marginal costs. Firm 1's marginal cost is MC = 5; it has a capacity constraint of K1 = 5 units. Firm 2's marginal cost is MC = 8; it has a capacity constraint of K2 = 2.5 units. Firm 3's marginal cost is MC = 10; it %3D has a capacity constraint of K3 = 2.5 units. A. The three firms compete in the style of Cournot. Please compute the Nash equilibrium quantities. Also compute the price in the Nash equilibrium. B. Which of these firms would have produced a larger quantity if it had a larger capacity? Please explain.
Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q) = 20 – Q. All firms have constant marginal costs. Firm 1’s marginal cost is MC = 5; it has a capacity constraint of K1 = 5 units. Firm 2’s marginal cost is MC = 8; it has a capacity constraint of K2 = 2.5 units. Firm 3’s marginal cost is MC = 10; it has a capacity constraint of K3 = 2.5 units. A. The three firms compete in the style of Cournot. Please compute the Nash equilibrium quantities. Also compute the price in the Nash equilibrium. B. Which of these firms would have produced a larger quantity if it had a larger capacity?
A firm supplies its product to a number of UK cities. Its overall cost function can be expressed as TC = 40q² + 900q – 250. The Demand function in Lancaster is given by p = 3600 - 10q and that in Norwich by p = 5040-6q. i) What prices should the firm charge for its product in Lancaster and Norwich? ii) If the firm only supplies its output to Lancaster and Norwich, is it profitable? Interpret your answer; why might the firm be unable to pursue this strategy? 5.
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