Two players, Player 1 and Player 2, are playing a game with two possible strategies A and B. Profits for each possible outcome are shown in the following table. Answer which statement is correct: Player 2 A B Player 1 A 2.2 -1.5 B 5.-1 -3,-5 Select one: a. The equilibrium in mixed strategies is {(4/7, 3/7), (2/5, 3/5)} ○ b. The equilibrium in mixed strategies is {(2/5, 3/5), (2/3, 1/3)} There are two Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: [5,-1] and [-1,5] C. d. There are two Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: [A,B] and [A,A]

Two players, Player 1 and Player 2, are playing a game with two possible strategies A and B. Profits for each possible outcome are shown in the following table. Answer which statement is correct: Player 2 A B Player 1 A 2.2 -1.5 B 5.-1 -3,-5 Select one: a. The equilibrium in mixed strategies is {(4/7, 3/7), (2/5, 3/5)} ○ b. The equilibrium in mixed strategies is {(2/5, 3/5), (2/3, 1/3)} There are two Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: [5,-1] and [-1,5] C. d. There are two Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: [A,B] and [A,A]

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3MC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

The following payoff matrix represents a simultaneous-move game between two players: Kay and Jack. Each player has two choices: Black or White. The first number in each cell is the payoff to Kay, and the second number is the payoff to Jack. Jay Black White 50, 30, Black 50 30 Кay 45, 40, White 30 50 Refer to the scenario above. Which is true? a. This game has a dominant strategy equilibrium. b. This game has two dominant strategy equilibria. c. This game has two Nash equilibria. d. This game has one Nash equilibrium.
K In a game, there are two players: Player 1 and Player 2. They have two strategies to select from, A and B. Where the first payoff and the second payoff in every cell is for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively. Which of the following is an example of a game without a dominant strategy? (Check all that apply.) A. C. Player 1 Player 1 A B A B A 3,-3 1, 1 A 2,1 0,0 Player 2 Player 2 B 3, -3 5, -5 B 0,0 1,2 B. D. Player 1 Player 1 A B A B A 1,-1 -1, 1 Player 2 Player 2 A 3.5, -1.5 2.7, -1 B -1, 1 1,-1 B -5, 3 0,0 If the dominant strategy for Player 1 is selecting strategy A and the dominant strategy for Player 2 is strategy B, then A B is an example of a c From ame C Murat Çok Di id Kushn y My Hand
Suppose that Green Giant and Red Rover are two companies competing in the canned vegetable market. Each is contemplating an aggressive new ad campaign. The payoffs of each decision are listed below, where Green Giant is player 1. Green/Red Ad Campaign No Ad Campaign |Ad Campaign |1 million, 1 million zero, 3 million No Ad Campaign 3 million, zero 2 million, 2 million What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? a. (advertise, don't advertise) b. (advertise, advertise) c. (don't advertise, don't advertise) d. (don't advertise, advertise)
1. A row of minus signs is written on a whiteboard (can be any number). Two players take turns in replacing either a single minus sign by a plus sign or two adjacent minus signs by two plus signs. The player who makes the last move wins. Discuss the possible strategy for the first mover to force a win.
Suppose this is a one-shot game played by City Potato Farm and Country Potato Farm. What is the cooperative outcome of this game? Is it a good prediction of this game? options, pick one: Both City Potato Farm and Country Potato Farm produce 7,000 potatoes; Yes Both City Potato Farm and Country Potato Farm produce 5,000 potatoes; Yes Both City Potato Farm and Country Potato Farm produce 5,000 potatoes; No City Potato Farm produces 7,000 potatoes and Country Potato Farm produces 5,000 potatoes; No Both City Potato Farm and Country Potato Farm produce 7,000 potatoes; No
Use the following game table to answer the question: Player 2 Y A 10, 5 6, 3 0,0 Player 1 B 2,6 1, 3 0,0 3,5 3, 4 3, 3 One of these players has a strictly dominant strategy. Which player, and what strategy is it? Player 2; Y Player 1; A Player 2; X O Player 1; B O Player 1; X
Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Strategy A B C 12, 12 18, 15 a. What is player 1's optimal strategy? Player 1 D 21, 7 13, 12 Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. Strategy B. Strategy A. b. Determine player 1's equilibrium payoff. E 7, 14 16, 18 F 15, 8 7, 8
Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 1 Strategy A B с 21, 5 13, 4 a. What is player 1's optimal strategy? D 25, 9 28, 11 Strategy A. Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. O Strategy B. b. Determine player 1's equilibrium payoff. Player 2 E 18, 15 9, 18 F 12, 12 14, 16
GAME 5 Player B B1 B2 Player A A1 7,3 | 5, 10 A2 3, 8| 9, 6 In Game 5 above, O Neither player has a dominant strategy. O Player B has a dominant strategy. O Player A has a dominant strategy. O Both players have dominant strategies.
GAME Z Player A B1 A1 7, 13 A2 3,8 Player B B2 15, 10 9,16 A3 5,8 4,7 In Game Z (see table above), assuming players move simultaneously. Which of the following is true? Player A has a dominant strategy Player B has a dominant strategy Both players have dominant strategies O Neither player has a dominant strategy
Consider the following centipede game consisting of two players, Pl and P2. The left/right number each terminal node represents Pl's/P2's payoff, respectively. Then, answer the following questions of [D5] and [M5]-|M8]: P1 G P2 P1 G -(0, 2) D (2, 0) (1, 1) (4, 0) Suppose that P2 chooses G or D randomly. Then, what is the Pl's best response of P1 for the P2's choice? And explain why. We assume that random choice is level-0 in the level-k theory. Then, answer the P2's choice in level-2. (a) D (b) G (c) random choice on (G, D) (d) G with probability 1/3 Answer all the properties of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium which is derives from the backward induction. (a) All subgame perfect equilibria are Nash equilibria in any game. (b) All Nash equilibria are subgame perfect equilibria in any game. (c) There is always a unique Nash equilibrium in any game. (d) There exist pure-strategy Nash equilibria in any game. (e) The Nash equilibrium in prisoners' dilemma game is socially…
5. Aaron and Betty play the following one-shot game. Aaron Up Middle Down Left 10,0 5,10 1,1 Betty Right 0,5 1,0 2,2 a. Does the game above have any (pure strategy) Nash equilibria? Find any equilibria or explain why an equilibrium doesn't exist. b. Suppose instead that Aaron moves first and Betty moves second. Represent this situation with a game tree and find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Are Aaron and Betty better off playing a simultaneous game or a sequential game in which Aaron moves first? Explain. c.