please only do: if you can teach explain steps How does pb compare to the lowest price ps at which Leila is willing to sell at least oneshare? Are they same? Explain.Solution: Since Leila is risk averse, she will only agree to buy or sell if doing so yieldsa positive expected value. Therefore, we must havehow to solve for this: ps > 1/2 > pb (and in particular,ps > pb).b) chow to solve for this:for Vadim is 4, and therefore p0b < pb. particularly active this season involves betting on the winner of the U.S. presidential election.Thus, for example, if one trader buys one share of "Obama to win" from another trader,then if Obama wins the election the seller pays 1 dollar to the buyer, and if Obama does notwin the seller pays nothing; either way, the seller keeps the money paid by the buyer for thepurchase of the share.(a) Leila is an expected utility maximizer with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u(x) =In(x + 1) and initial wealth 4. Leila believes that Obama will win with probability 1/2.Find the highest price p, at which she is willing to buy at least one share.Solution: The price po solveswhich implies thatand therefore,This equation has solutions1In(5-ps) +:+In(6-pt) = ln 5,(5-Pb) (6-Pb) = 5,P² - 11ps + 5 = 0.11 ± √101Pb=2Since the price must clearly be less than 1 for Leila to buy, we obtainPb=11 - √1012(b) How does p, compare to the lowest price p, at which Leila is willing to sell at least oneshare? Are they same? Explain.Solution: Since Leila is risk averse, she will only agree to buy or sell if doing so yieldsa positive expected value. Therefore, we must have p. > 1/2> p (and in particular,Ps > Pb).(c) Vadim is more risk averse than Leila. He also believes that Obama will win with prob-ability 1/2. How does the highest price at which he is willing to buy at least one sharecompare to ps (i.e. to the corresponding price for Leila)? Prove your answer.Solution: Let p denote the highest price at which Vadim is willing to buy, and let L(p)denote the lottery associated with buying one share at price p. For Leila, the certaintyequivalent of the lottery L(ps) is 4. Since Vadim is more risk averse than Leila, thecertainty equivalent of L(P) for him is less than 4. But the certainty equivalent of L(ps)for Vadim is 4, and therefore p < P-

In economics, a utility function quantifies a person's preferences and the satisfaction they obtain…

particularly active this season involves betting on the winner of the U.S. presidential election. Thus, for example, if one trader buys one share of "Obama to win" from another trader, then if Obama wins the election the seller pays 1 dollar to the buyer, and if Obama does not win the seller pays nothing; either way, the seller keeps the money paid by the buyer for the purchase of the share. (a) Leila is an expected utility maximizer with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u(x) = In(x + 1) and initial wealth 4. Leila believes that Obama will win with probability 1/2. Find the highest price p, at which she is willing to buy at least one share. Solution: The price pa solves

particularly active this season involves betting on the winner of the U.S. presidential election. Thus, for example, if one trader buys one share of "Obama to win" from another trader, then if Obama wins the election the seller pays 1 dollar to the buyer, and if Obama does not win the seller pays nothing; either way, the seller keeps the money paid by the buyer for the purchase of the share. (a) Leila is an expected utility maximizer with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u(x) = In(x + 1) and initial wealth 4. Leila believes that Obama will win with probability 1/2. Find the highest price p, at which she is willing to buy at least one share. Solution: The price pa solves

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.3P

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Upon graduating from UT this May, you take on a management position working at UtMax theater. You will consider the utility of seeing performance over 1 month, and suppose that at a regular price of $$$ per ticket (my assigned ticket price is 145), customers will see no performance, however with the price reduced by $5, customers will see one performance per month and when reduced by $10, customers will see two performances. As long as the number performances, x, is small, your demand function for performance can be modeled by p=D(x). Write down your demand function.
You are considering two options for your next family vacation. You can visit Disney World or Chicago. Your utility from Disney World is 100 if the weather is clear, and 0 if it rains. Chicago is worth a utility of 70 if the weather is clear and a utility of 40 if the weather is rainy. Also assume that the chance of rain at Disney World is going to be 50% and the chance of rain in Chicago is 40%. As a utility maximizer, should you plan to go to Disney World or Chicago? (Explain using relevant equations)
Suppose that Mike, with utility function, u(x) = v x+5000, is offered a gamble where a coin is flipped twice, and if the coin comes up heads both times (probability - .25), he gets $40,000. Would he prefer this gamble or $7,500 for sure? What is his Certainty Equivalent?
Your utility function is given by M1/2. You have $100 and are planning to invest in a venture where you can win or lose 50 with equal probability. Will you accept the venture? What is the minimum gain you need to make in the good scenario such that you will invest in the venture?
2. Alice believes that her car would cost £12500 to replace if it was stolen or damaged. Based on crime statistics for the area she lives in, she believes that the probability of her car being stolen or damaged is 0.15. (i) Alice's utility function is given by U(w) = ln(w) for w > 0 and she as £35000 in the bank. Calculate how much Alice would be prepared to pay (in a single payment) to insure her car against theft or damage (ii) Repeat the calculation in the previous part but now assume Alice has £500000 in the bank.
Seung’s utility function is given by U = ln(C), where C is consumption. She makes $30,000 per year and enjoy jumping out of airplanes. There's a 5% chance that in the next year, she will break both legs, incur medical costs of $15,000, and lose an additional $5,000 from missing work. (a) What is Seung’s expected utility without insurance? (b) Suppose Seung can buy insurance that will cover the medical expenses but not the forgone part of her salary. How much would an actuarially fair policy cost, and what is her expected utility if she buys it? (c) Suppose Seung can buy insurance that will cover her medical expenses and forgone salary. How much would such a policy cost if it's actuarially fair, and what is her expected utility if she buys it?
Hello can any one help with this Economics question: A contractor spends Dollar 3,000 to prepare for a bid on a construction project which, after deducting manufacturing expenses and the cost of bidding, will yield a profit of dollar 25,000 if the bid is won. If the chance of winning the bid is ten per cent, compute his expected profit and state the likely decision on whether to bid or not to bid?
. Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain.
A young consumer has to decide how to spend his spare time. He can either watch movies x or play online video games y. Each round of the game cost 20 and each movie cost 20. He has 200 dollars to spend each week. In addition, he has time constraint. He can spend no more than 20 hours for entertainment each week. A movie last 2 hours and playing a game takes about 1 hour. His utility is given by √xy. Use the Kuhn-Tucker condition to find his optimal choice. (Assume that x and y can take any value, not necessarily integers.) Does the solution satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition for a maximum?
Chris Traeger is trying to decide whether or not to purchase health insurance. Chris knows that if he is healthy, his wealth will be $2,000 this year. However, if he gets sick his wealth will only be $500. Chris knows the probability of getting sick is 40%. His utility function is written below. U = (2) What is utility if the individual purchases insurance at the actuarially fair price? 25.29 utils 26.46 utils 31.62 utils 18.97 utils
Gary likes to gamble. Donna offers to bet him $31 on the outcome of a boat race. If Gary’s boat wins, Donna would give him $31. If Gary’s boat does not win, Gary would give her $31. Gary’s utility function is p1x^21+p2x^22, where p1 and p2 are the probabilities of events 1 and 2 and where x1 and x2 are his wealth if events 1 and 2 occur respectively. Gary’s total wealth is currently only $80 and he believes that the probability that he will win the race is 0.3. Which of the following is correct? (please submit the number corresponding to the correct answer). Taking the bet would reduce his expected utility. Taking the bet would leave his expected utility unchanged. Taking the bet would increase his expected utility. There is not enough information to determine whether taking the bet would increase or decrease his expected utility. The information given in the problem is self-contradictory.
Gary likes to gamble. Donna offers to bet him $31 on the outcome of a boat race. If Gary's boat wins, Donna would give him $31. If Gary's boat does not win, Gary would give her $31. Gary's utility function is p1x^21+p2x^22, where P₁ and p2 are the probabilities of events 1 and 2 and where x₁ and x₂ are his wealth if events 1 and 2 occur respectively. Gary's total wealth is currently only $80 and he believes that the probability that he will win the race is 0.3. Which of the following is correct? (please submit the number corresponding to the correct answer). 1. Taking the bet would reduce his expected utility. 2. Taking the bet would leave his expected utility unchanged. 3. Taking the bet would increase his expected utility. 4. There is not enough information to determine whether taking the bet would increase or decrease his expected utility. 5. The information given in the problem is self-contradictory.